The political economy of global environmental governance by Newell, Peter
Review of International Studies
http://journals.cambridge.org/RIS
Additional services for Review of International Studies:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
The political economy of global environmental governance
PETER NEWELL
Review of International Studies / Volume 34 / Issue 03 / July 2008, pp 507 - 529
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210508008140, Published online: 30 May 2008
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0260210508008140
How to cite this article:
PETER NEWELL (2008). The political economy of global environmental governance. Review of International Studies, 34, pp
507-529 doi:10.1017/S0260210508008140
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/RIS, IP address: 84.92.41.220 on 26 Jun 2014
Review of International Studies (2008), 34, 507–529 Copyright  British International Studies Association
doi:10.1017/S0260210508008140
The political economy of global
environmental governance
PETER NEWELL*
Abstract. This article develops a political economy account of global environmental govern-
ance to improve upon our understanding of the contemporary conduct of environmental
politics and to clarify thinking about the potential for, and barriers to, eﬀective environmental
reform. By elaborating the key contours of a political economy account on the one hand and
opening up to critical enquiry prevailing understandings of what is meant by ‘global’
‘environmental’ and ‘governance’ on the other, such an approach is able to enhance our
understanding of the practice of environmental governance by emphasising historical, material
and political elements of its (re) constitution and evolution.
Introduction
This article develops a critical political economy account of global environmental
governance to improve upon our understanding of the contemporary conduct of
environmental politics and to clarify thinking about the potential for, and barriers to,
eﬀective environmental reform. By elaborating the key contours of a political
economy account on the one hand and opening up to critical enquiry prevailing
understandings of governance on the other, such an approach is able to enhance
our comprehension of the practice of environmental governance by emphasising
historical, material and political elements of its (re) constitution and evolution. It is
argued that an account of this nature is better placed to address the key questions
which drive any enquiry into governance issues and which are no less pertinent to
appreciating the changing nature of environmental governance. These are:
• What is to be governed? (and what is not?)
• Who governs and who is governed?
• How do they govern?
• On whose behalf?
• With what implications?
The first part of the article reflects on the insights and limitations of conventional
interpretations of environmental governance within the discipline of International
Relations (IR). The second part articulates the need for a diﬀerently grounded
approach, driven both by the analytical weaknesses of existing approaches and
changes in the global system that require more sophisticated and critical approaches
* I am grateful to David Levy, two anonymous referees and the Journal editor for useful suggestions
on an earlier draft of this article.
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to explanation. The third part elucidates the key elements of a political economy
approach, assembling diverse theoretical tools towards this end and providing
examples of the insights they generate in practice that help to address the questions
identified above. The article concludes with reflections on the benefits that might be
derived from such an approach.
Global environmental governance: conventional perspectives
The Global Environmental Outlook report notes:
The global human ecosystem is threatened by grave imbalances in productivity and in the
distribution of goods and services. . . . This unsustainable progression of extremes of wealth
and poverty threatens the stability of the whole human system, and with it the global
environment . . . Environmental gains from new technology and policies are being overtaken
by the pace and scale of population growth and economic development. The processes of
globalisation that are so strongly influencing social evolution need to be directed towards
resolving rather than aggravating the serious imbalances that divide the world today.1
Despite repeated acknowledgements such as this that patterns of globalisation render
the fragile systems of global environmental governance increasingly irrelevant or
impotent, orthodox theorisation of the challenge of managing global environmental
change (GEC) within International Relations continues to look to international
regimes for the answers. It is not a caricature to suggest that environmental
governance for many scholars of IR continues to be reduced to the study of
international environmental law and the institutions that produce it and enforce it,
even if there is increasing attention to the ways in which non-state actors can facilitate
inter-state bargains.2 Debate continues to centre on how to motivate self-interested
states to act in ways which protect and enhance the global commons. This reflects the
legacy of regime approaches which continue to enjoy a privileged status in the study
of global environmental politics.3 Applied to the problematic of managing the global
commons, regime theory appears to provide a useful analytical grounding for the
conceptualisation of such problems.4
From the point of view of understanding the ineﬀectiveness of international
cooperation in containing, let alone reversing, the problems for which it has been set
up to address, however, regime theory provides few clues beyond the answers that
any traditional IR account would oﬀer: the problem of managing free-riders that
benefit from public goods without taking action themselves, the weakness of
1 UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook (London: Earthscan and UNEP 1999), p. xx; emphasis
added.
2 Bas Arts, ‘Non-State Actors in Global Environmental Governance: New Arrangements Beyond the
State’, in Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Michael Zu¨rn (eds), New Modes of Governance in the
Global System: Exploring Publicness, Delegation and Inclusiveness (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006),
pp. 177–201; Peter Newell, Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the
Greenhouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michelle Betstill and Elizabeth Correll,
‘NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis’, Global
Environmental Politics, 1:4 (2001), pp. 65–85.
3 Oran Young, Global Governance: Learning Lessons from the Environmental Experience (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1998); Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of Eﬀective Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
4 John Vogler, The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis (Sussex: Wiley, 1995).
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sanctions in the absence of global government, institutional fragility in the absence of
the backing of a hegemonic state or the need to create a shadow of the future to
induce cooperative behaviour.5 There is little attention to the particular nature of
environmental problems and the political and material relations which create them
and within which they are managed. Traditional theoretical tools and assumptions
about the nature of global politics are instead brought to bear on the issue of
environmental change.6 Understanding environmental problems and politics from
the point at which they enter the remit of global institutions is to neglect the prior
political and materials relations that account for the production of environmental
harm. The question ‘which social relations make environmental degradation
possible?’ helps to identify the interests and relations of power at play and serves
to draw attention to the existing networks of environmental governance that
inter-state responses need to engage and reform. As is argued below, it is highly
unlikely that these operate exclusively within public domains, are managed by
states or, in many cases, are amenable to interventions by international institu-
tions. Employing theoretical lines of enquiry that (1) centre on bargaining between
states, assumed to be cohesive rational actors with the resources, capacity and
willingness to engage in environmental reform, (2) within international public
arenas, assumed to be the key arenas in which decisions are made about the
environment, and (3) at the international level, assumed to be the sphere in which
‘global’ politics occur and within which ‘global’ environmental change has to be
addressed, is to misread who the key actors are in the quotidian practice of
environmental governance and to overlook the multiplicity of arenas where
environmental politics occur.
The appeal of regime theory for scholars of the environment nevertheless endures7
despite critiques from a range of quarters regarding the static nature of much regime
analysis, the state-centricity of the approach, and its neglect of many of the broader
political and economic forces that condition the context in which regimes emerge,
evolve and the extent to which they are eﬀective.8 Attempts to evolve regime theory
in new directions and to build on critiques of mainstream approaches may yet help
to articulate a pluralist account of global governance in which non-state actors play
a more active part, perhaps further developing ideas about ‘complex multilateralism’
or reinvigorating debates about ‘transnationalism’.9 Gale’s construction of a neo-
Gramscian perspective on international regimes, combined with Keeley’s earlier
Foucauldian reading of international regimes as ‘regimes of truth’, represent perhaps
5 Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment: Actors and
Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Hugh Ward, ‘Game Theory and the Politics of Global
Warming: The State of Play and Beyond’, Political Studies, XLIV (1996), pp. 850–71.
6 Julian Saurin, ‘International Relations, Social Ecology and the Globalization of Environmental
Change’, in John Vogler and Mark Imber (eds), The Environment in International Relations
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 77–99.
7 Norichika Kanie and Peter M. Haas (eds), Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance (Hong
Kong: United Nations University Press, 2004); John Vogler, ‘In Defense of International
Environmental Cooperation’, in John Barry and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The State and the Global
Ecological Crisis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 229–55.
8 Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in Stephen Krasner (ed.),
International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1983), pp. 337–54.
9 Robert O’Brien, Anne-Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams, Contesting Global
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robert Keohane and Joesph Nye,
Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
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the most innovative departures, opening up the possibility that ‘international
organisations are arenas of struggle between global actors over the normative
structures that govern (or should govern) specific issue areas’.10 Gale’s insights in
particular about the possibilities of developing post-liberal and critical understand-
ings of regimes and the bargains that underpin them, provide useful insights for the
framework proposed here.
Even if it can be argued that a focus upon regimes is appropriate for IR
specialists wanting to account for institutional arrangements that have been
constructed at the global level to protect the environment, this question cannot
increasingly be divorced from an understanding of the nature of the contemporary
global political economy and its implications for the future direction of environ-
mental politics. This is especially so amid increasing evidence of private actors
assuming public functions of regulation and stewardship with regard to natural
resources. As Saurin notes, ‘international political analysis continues to be con-
ducted as if environmental goods and bads are produced, accumulated and
therefore regulated by public organisations. They are not.’11 Tracking shifting
patterns of trade, production and finance will tell us much about the sources and
drivers of environmental change. Likewise, studying the investment decisions of
firms, banks and other financial actors and the political role of these actors in
environmental governance will provide the basis for understanding what forms of
action are possible and practicable in the contemporary neoliberal global
economy. Both in terms of their influence financially and politically, as well as
their ecological footprint, they dwarf the role of state environmental agencies that
remain the point of reference for most IR specialists.
Given the centrality of market actors to environmental governance, we should
expect IPE to provide the basis of a clear articulation of a political economy of the
environment. IPE scholars have tended to neglect environmental issues, however.
Indeed, it is more the case that writers on the environment have sought to make use
of concepts and debates in IPE to account for the global politics of the environ-
ment.12 Only rarely have scholars of IPE sought to understand the significance of
environmental issues for mainstream theory, or use Green political theory to
challenge conventional thinking within International Relations.13 Insights from IPE
on these issues have yet to capture the imagination of much mainstream thinking in
10 Fred Gale, ‘ ‘‘Cave! Hic dragones’’ ’: A Neo-Gramscian Deconstruction and Reconstruction of
International Regime Theory’, Review of International Political Economy, 5:2 (1998), pp. 252–83, at
270; James Keeley, ‘Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes’, International
Organisation, 44:1 (1990), pp. 83–105.
11 Julian Saurin, ‘Global Environmental Crisis as ‘‘Disaster Triumphant’’: The Private Capture of
Public Goods’, Environmental Politics, 10:4 (2001), pp. 63–84, at 80.
12 Julian Saurin, ‘International Relations, Social Ecology and the Globalisation of Environmental
Change’, in John Vogler and Mark Imber (eds), The Environment and International Relations
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 77–99; Marc Williams, ‘International Political Economy and
Global Environmental Change’, ibid., pp. 41–58; Dimitris Stevis and Valerie Assetto (eds), The
International Political Economy of the Environment: Critical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2001); Matthew Paterson, Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination,
Accumulation, Resistance (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Peter Newell, ‘Towards a political economy
of global environmental governance’, in Peter Dauvergne (ed.), Handbook of Global Environmental
Politics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005), pp. 187–202.
13 Eric Helleiner, ‘International Political Economy and the Greens’, New Political Economy, 1:1
(1996), pp. 59–77; Eric Laferrie`re, ‘Emancipating International Relations Theory: An Ecological
Perspective’, Millennium, 25:1 (1996), pp. 53–75; Eric Laferrie`re and Peter Stoett, International
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IR, however, which continues with a relatively state-centric reading of questions of
international cooperation.
Exploring in detail the intimate relationship between global environmental change
and the contemporary organisation of the global economy continues to demand,
therefore, a realignment of our priorities for theoretical enquiry and practical
application. The appeal of existing modes of engagement is that they draw on
prevailing theoretical orthodoxies and assumptions about the role of international
institutions, the nature of the international system and the organisation of global
politics. Normatively, however, if we start from a desire to understand the political
nature of environmental change and a commitment to identifying the most eﬀective
types of political intervention, we assume an obligation to think outside traditional
and convenient theoretical parameters.
Aside from the shortcomings of conventional theoretical thinking regarding the
contemporary practice of environmental governance, there is a strong, and related,
sense in which changes in patterns of authority and decision-making in the global
economy have served to reconfigure patterns of environmental governance in ways
which suggest the need for theoretical innovation. These changes include a widening
and deepening in the range of actors producing environmental harm and involved in
its regulation (dispersed, global, private, beyond state regulation). Changes in the
governance and exploitation of environmental resources have been brought about
through shifting patterns of production and investment, through changes in the
nature of standard-setting and institutional authority, and through increased partici-
pation by business and civil society actors in global environmental debates. Denser,
multi-sited and increasingly transnational forms of governance that have resulted
from shifts in the relationship between states and markets, and between public and
private international bodies with authority in the environmental domain, require a
theoretical account able to adequately capture these dynamics.
Toward a political economy approach
Both as a result of changes in the global system described above and the limitations
of conventional approaches to environmental governance noted previously, an
emerging body of critical work has sought to demonstrate, often in issue specific or
very general ways, the merits of what might be considered a critical political economy
approach which locates global environmental governance within broader patterns of
governance designed to promote (and manage) the globalisation of the economy.14
Studies of the governance of particular technologies15 or in relation to specific actors
such as the role of business in global environmental governance16 provide indications
Relations Theory and Ecological Thought: Towards a Synthesis (London and New York: Routledge,
1999).
14 Matthew Paterson, David Humphreys and Lloyd Pettiford, ‘Conceptualizing Global Environmental
Governance: From Interstate Regimes to Counter-Hegemonic Struggles’, Global Environmental
Politics, 3:2 (2003), pp. 1–10, at 5.
15 Rodney Loeppky, ‘History, Technology and the Capitalist State: The Comparative Political
Economy of Biotechnology and Genomics’, Review of International Political Economy, 12:2 (2005),
pp. 264–86; Peter Newell, ‘Globalisation and the Governance of Biotechnology’, Global
Environmental Politics, 3:2 (2003), pp. 56–72.
16 David Levy and Peter Newell (eds), The Business of Global Environmental Governance (Cambridge
MA: MIT, 2005).
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of the insights to be gained from such an account of environmental governance, but
have yet to be articulated as a generic approach. This is in spite of attempts to explore
disparate elements of an ‘ecological political economy’,17 or to analyse in general
terms the interface between the global economy and global environmental politics,
adopting case studies or competing perspectives to account for this relationship.18
Critical, often Marxist-inspired, accounts meanwhile have sought to address the
question of capitalism’s (in)compatibility with the achievement of sustainability,
without exploring in detail the governance mechanisms which seek to manage this
relationship.19
We still lack, therefore, a clear articulation of the contents and application of a
coherent political economy approach to global environmental governance, one that
has potential to provide explanations across diverse issue areas, oﬀering a diﬀerent
view of ‘global’(ity), what counts as ‘environmental’ and how we conceive of
‘governance’. The approach developed here builds upon and resonates with the
work of Paterson20 and Saurin,21 but rather than develop a theory of global
environmental politics, as Paterson does, that embraces the role of capitalism,
modernity and patriarchy in (re)producing environmental crises, the task here is
more modest; to refine and demonstrate the utility of a political economy
approach in relation to contemporary patterns of environmental governance, rather
than the sum of all global environmental politics. The starting point for Saurin is
to explain the apparent incongruence between a growing environmental crisis in
the face of unprecedented degrees of international coordination, regulation and
technical advance.22 Explaining environmental degradation as a routine conse-
quence of existing structures of power, Paterson’s approach is to ‘disrupt the
notion that international power structures are neutral with respect to environ-
mental change’ by demonstrating that environmental change originates not in
‘interstate collective action problems, nor in a set of ad hoc trends, but in the
internal dynamics of both systems of accumulation and exploitation and systems
of domination’.23 The approach developed here seeks an understanding and
explanation of the relationship between the economic structures and agents
responsible for the production of environmental harm and those actors, coalitions
and networks engaged in the construction of environmental governance in the
contemporary global political economy. The following sub-sections develop the
key elements of such an account.
17 Fred Gale and Michael M’Gonigle, Nature, Production and Power: Towards an Ecological Political
Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000).
18 Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global
Environment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Gabriela Ku¨tting, Globalization and Environment:
Greening Global Political Economy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005).
19 B. Sandler, ‘Grow or Die: Marxist Theories of Capitalism and the Environment’, Rethinking
Marxism, 7 (1994), pp. 38–57; Andriana Vlachou, ‘The Contradictory Interaction of Capitalism
and Nature’, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 4 (March 1993), pp. 102–8; Andriana Vlachou,
‘Capitalism and Ecological Sustainability: The Shaping of Environmental Policies’, Review of
International Political Economy, 11:5 (2004), pp. 926–52; M. O’Connor (ed.), Is Capitalism
Sustainable? Political Economy and the Politics of Ecology (New York: Guilford Press, 1994).
20 Matthew Paterson, ‘Car Culture and Global Environmental Politics’, Review of International
Studies, 26:2 (2000), pp. 253–71, and Understanding Global Environmental Politics.
21 Saurin, ‘International Relations’ and ‘Global Environmental Crisis’.
22 Saurin, ‘Global Environmental Crisis’, p. 65.
23 Paterson, Understanding Global Environmental Politics, p. 5.
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Placing the relationship between states-markets-civil society centrally
A political economy of global environmental governance has to place the dynamic
relationship between states and markets centrally, reflecting the fact that global
environmental governance cannot be understood separately from broader shifts in
authority in global politics. It can do so, however, in a way that does not assume an
artificial separation between state and market or the a priori autonomy of either.
Rather than reify this relationship at the expense of the ‘absent other’, civil society,
it places their inter-relationship at the heart of enquiry, exploring its configurations
across global society. This is fundamental to challenging what Saurin calls a
‘misidentification’ of the nature of the modern environmental crisis which rests upon
‘the persistence with and development of the separation of the political and
economic, the public and private and the corresponding diﬀerentiation of agents,
agency, structure, responsibility and liability on a global scale’.24
Such an approach would expect key changes in the relationship between and
within states and markets to produce new forms of environmental governance.
Debates about the transfer of power from state to market have a long lineage, yet
narratives about globalisation have given them a new salience in debates about
whether state power is in retreat, being reconstituted or may actually be expanding.25
The answer to these questions depends very much on which aspect of state power is
under scrutiny. While state budgets for environmental action are often squeezed in
the face of fiscal discipline imposed by international financial institutions, reducing
state capacity, state authority is often also strengthened by the acquisition of new
bureaucratic functions of pollution monitoring and enforcement that are associated
with membership of global accords. In more critical terms, Benton also argues that
states have been empowered by the ideology of globalisation and by the increased
mobility of capital which has enabled them to ‘weaken environmental legislation and
generally to align state policy more closely with the interests of dominant and
transnational capital’.26 The extent to which these trends towards the erosion or
reconfiguration of state power apply also depends very much on the state in question.
In a context of weakened state structures, the power and privileges of business groups
are enhanced such that ‘At the very time statist theorists were ‘bringing the state back
in’, the importance of private actors in formulating state policies was actually
increasing in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world’.27 As with other areas of
global politics, there are few conveniently simple, globally applicable, narratives
about state power in environmental governance.
Just as theories of the firm seek to get inside the ‘black box’ of the firm,28 so too
theories of the state need to look inside the state for an understanding of the
importance of bureaucratic politics and policy networks. This is significant because
24 Saurin, ‘Global Environmental Crisis’, p. 63.
25 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Linda
Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
26 Ted Benton, ‘An Ecological Historical Materialism’, in Fred Gale and Michael M’Gonigle (eds),
Nature, Production and Power: Towards an Ecological Political Economy (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2000), pp. 83–105, at 104.
27 Ronald W. Cox (ed.), Business, State and International Relations (New York: New York University
Press, 1996), p. 5.
28 Louise Amoore, ‘International Political Economy and the Contested Firm’, New Political Economy,
5:2 (2000), pp. 183–204.
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businesses are better connected with some parts of the state than others and these
patterns of influence extend into the international sphere.29 While environmental
bureaucracies in stronger states tend to be well embedded by virtue of engagement
with global decision-making processes on the environment and through close ties to
global epistemic communities,30 ministries of trade and finance with which they are
often in competition over environmental policies with significant budgetary or trade
policy implications, are equally well globalised, but operate in global arenas such as
the WTO that are conferred greater authority than their environmental counterparts.
Power imbalances within the state are mirrored and reproduced by inequalities in the
distribution of power between international institutions. Likewise, uneven distribu-
tions of power between states and firms at national level, where the latter’s mobility
and ability to relocate provide enhanced bargaining leverage, are reflected in and
reinforced by public inter-state legal protection of private power. When multilateral
rules ostensibly aimed at protecting the global commons conflict with attempts to
multilaterally protect private access to, and control over, those resources the telling
question is ‘Whose rules rule?’31 Multilateral environmental negotiations are increas-
ingly conducted in the shadow of world trade rules.32 This prioritisation of economic
over environmental rule-making reflects what Gill refers to as the ‘new constitution-
alism’ to describe the ways in which the rights of capital over states are being
enshrined in international trade and investment agreements.33 In the environmental
field, the debate within the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) over access, benefit-
sharing and IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights) can be interpreted as a struggle to
define corporate entitlements to the commons. Debates about bio-piracy and
bio-prospecting are concerned with the boundaries of corporate access to natural
resources and the compensation firms are expected to provide to the communities
from whom the resources have been extracted. Indeed, it was primarily concerns
about how the CBD would aﬀect the access of the US pharmaceutical industry to
such resources that led President Bush (senior) to refuse to sign the accord.34
Strange’s model of ‘triangular diplomacy’ that describes the triangle of relations
among states, between states and firms and among firms, provides a useful way of
understanding many dimensions of global bargaining, even if it has less to say about
the role of civil society actors.35 Firms with a presence at international negotiations
on the environment bargain with one another over which positions to adopt in an
attempt to reflect diverse and often contradictory interests. They then adopt formal
and informal strategies to register their views with government through bodies such
29 Peter Newell, ‘Lost in Translation? Domesticating Global Policy on GMOs: Comparing India and
China’, Global Society, 22:1 (2008), pp. 117–38.
30 Peter Haas, ‘Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus’,
Millennium, 19:3 (1990), pp. 347–63.
31 This phrase was used in a World Development Movement campaign about the impact of trade
rules on the world’s poor.
32 Ken Conca, ‘The WTO and the undermining of global environmental governance’, Review of
International Political Economy, 7:3 (2000), pp. 484–94.
33 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, market civilisation and disciplinary neoliberalism’, Millennium:
Journal of International Relations, 24:3 (1995), pp. 399–423.
34 Kal Raustiala, ‘The Domestic Politics of Global Biodiversity Protection in the United Kingdom
and United States’, in Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy (eds), The Internationalisation of
Environmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 42–74.
35 Susan Strange, ‘Rethinking Structural Change in the International Political Economy: States, Firms
and Diplomacy’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoﬀrey Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the
Changing Global Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 103–16.
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as the Global Industry Coalition on biotechnology. A political economy account
would need to go further, however, in asking why some coalitions of interest prevail
over others. In contrast to pluralist accounts, a structural approach would suggest
that owners of capital exercise structural power over state managers, in that they are
able to shape the context in which states make decisions. As Paterson shows ‘because
of the necessity of growth for capitalism to survive, those organising such growth,
defined generally as capital, gain a great deal of power with respect to state
decision-making’.36 There have been many documented examples of the leading role
played by large firms in vetoing provisions of global environmental accords
threatening to their interests.37 Some structuralist approaches go further in question-
ing the very division of state and market. Vlachou puts it the following way; ‘state
policies towards nature and the ecological changes initiated in capitalism are not
‘external or artificial’ barriers to capital. They are the outcome of internal processes
and also constitutive elements of capital as a social relation’.38
That a political economy account requires a theory of the state is reinforced by a
recognition that the state is not a neutral actor in environmental governance. Conca
notes; ‘The emergence of the centralising, industrialising, national state, with its
capacity to centralise decision-making, concentrate capital, strip local communities
of their historical property rights in nature, supply coercive power and protect elite
interests, has been a key social innovation along the road to global planetary peril’.39
Risk and hazard, access and benefit are routinely, necessarily, allocated in ways
which reflect and enhance existing social inequalities. This reflects the fact, in part,
that political elites have major interests in key economic sectors which exact
significant environmental damage including commercial logging, mineral and oil
exploitation and plantation cropping.40 We find evidence of Marx’s contention that
the capitalist state is ‘based on the contradiction between public and private life, on
the contradiction between general interests and private interests’.41 Its role is to
maintain market discipline and mediate between the contradictions of general and
particular interests within capital, such that competing fractions of capital seek to
present their interests as consistent with those of capital-in-general in environmental
as in other issue areas. This produces uncertain outcomes in contests over the
form that environmental governance should adopt. Vlachou notes ‘Although the
state assumes the capacity to secure the natural and other conditions for capitalism,
the choice of particular policies, their requirements as well as the incidence of
benefits and costs of such policies on diﬀerent agents . . . is not pre-determined’.42
36 Paterson, Understanding Global Environmental Politics, p. 46.
37 Peter Andre´e, ‘The Genetic Engineering Revolution in Agriculture and Food: Strategies of the
‘‘Biotech Bloc’’ ’, in David Levy and Peter Newell (eds), The Business of Global Environmental
Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 135–66; Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson,
‘A Climate for Business: Global Warming, the State and Capital’, Review of International Political
Economy, 5:4 (1998), pp. 679–704.
38 Vlachou, ‘Capitalism and Ecological Sustainability’, p. 928.
39 Ken Conca, ‘Old States in New Bottles? The Hybridization of Authority in Global Environmental
Governance’, in John Barry and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The State and the Global Ecological Crisis
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 181–207, p. 181.
40 Jeﬀ Haynes, ‘Power, Politics and Environmental Movements in the Third World’, in Chris Rootes
(ed.), Environmental Movements: Local, National and Global (London: Frank Cass, 1999),
pp. 222–43.
41 Karl Marx, The German Ideology, vol. 5 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), p. 46.
42 Vlachou, ‘Capitalism and ecological sustainability’, p. 933.
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Nevertheless, the state is not seen as a separate sphere with its own logic, not
‘suspended in mid-air’ as Marx noted, but giving form to economic institutions and
production relations. This allows us to locate the state within those larger relations
that are implied in the production of environmental degradation.
The lack of state theory employed in conventional analysis of environmental
governance has implications for how we conceive of the law and its potential to serve
as a vehicle for tackling environmental harm given the importance attached, a priori,
by conventional accounts, to international law as the governance mechanism for
managing the global commons whilst ignoring social relations within which law is
cast and which it serves to entrench. Cutler argues, ‘The possibility for the law to
exhibit bias or to serve unrepresentative interests or undemocratic ends is ruled out
by presumptions of the law as natural, neutral and consensual order’.43 Even
accepting that state laws to some extent do not intend to generate inequalities, ‘State
permitting laws remain neutral or blind toward these [environmental] inequalities;
they therefore perpetuate, and indeed exacerbate, distributional inequalities’.44 In this
reading, legal rules cannot be divorced from the material conditions in which they are
produced and seek to preserve since they form ‘a crucial constituent of property
relations and privatised class power’, and also form the ‘legal culture’ of a trans-
national bloc advancing a globalising neoliberal agenda under the guise of natural-
ised representations of property, market and capital’.45 Environmental politics are
inevitably played out on this broader canvas of material and institutional power.
Building upon these insights without over-ascribing a ‘productionist’ logic to all
governance arrangements, some of the insights from neo-Gramscian versions of
historical materialism become useful. Neo-Gramscian perspectives seek to go beyond
some of the more reductionist elements of structural accounts to look at the ways in
which coalitions are formed between state, capital and civil society in order to
preserve the hegemony of blocs whose interests are threatened by environmental
regulation. An environmental account would posit the ways in which fundamental
economic interests and privileges are protected through strategies that reify those
structures of property and decision-making from which the transnational managerial
class benefits. Alliances with conservative elements within the environmental move-
ment have been key to this strategy of accommodation, producing as Sklair shows,
‘a global environmental elite which has been more or less incorporated into the
transnational capitalist class’.46 The function of this sustainable development historic
bloc is to distance global capitalism from the sources of environmental problems,
accommodating some mild criticism of consumerism and globalisation without
allowing the ‘fatal connection’ between the capitalist mode of production and the
ecological crisis to be addressed.47 Global ecology literatures that emerged in the
wake of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) of 1992 suggest that this bloc has been very successful in the task of
43 Claire Cutler, ‘Historical Materialism, Globalization and Law’, in Mark Rupert Hazel Smith (eds),
Historical Materialism and Globalisation (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 230–56, at 233.
44 Luke Cole and Sheila Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the
Environmental Justice Movement (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 71.
45 Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds), ‘Editor’s Introduction’, Historical Materialism and
Globalisation (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1–13, p. 10.
46 Leslie Sklair, Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),
p. 276.
47 Ibid., p. 57.
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obscuring its own role in the processes it is ostensibly regulating, a process described
as analogous to putting ‘foxes in charge of chickens’.48
Embedding institutions within global economic processes
Grounding a political economy account still further requires us to demonstrate and
analyse the empirical links and theoretical implications that flow from the intimate
relationship between environmental change and its governance, and the organisation
of the global political economy. A political economy rendition of environmental
governance needs to explore how trade, production and finance shape the possibili-
ties and limitations of governance arrangements; analysing them as economic
structures and through the policy processes they generate. A focus on the mode of
production and the social relations which flow from this help us to understand this
in terms of ‘specific, historically and geographically variable forms of social
organisation’.49 This is in contrast to orthodox IR approaches to the study of global
environmental change which, as Saurin notes, take as given ‘the questions of what is
produced, how it is produced, who controls production – in other words all the key
questions pertaining to the actual transformation of nature’.50
Other work has adequately shown, in discrete ways, how patterns of trade,
production and finance (and the links between them) are central to understanding the
contemporary world of environmental politics.51 Non-environmental regimes, those
governing trade, production and finance, with substantial environmental profiles,
both in terms of the authority they exercise over resource access and use and their
ecological footprint, are critical to the possibilities of eﬀective environmental
governance. Debates about the types of regulation and political action necessary to
tackle many environmental problems are increasingly conducted in the shadow of,
and often trumped by, parallel concerns with trade and global market integration.
This narrowing of the terms of the debate to political solutions that can comfort-
ably be accommodated within the business-as-usual model of contemporary neo-
liberalism serves to marginalise and delegitimise alternative modes of environmental
governance that may be more eﬀective.
For example, calls to tie the liberalisation of trade to basic environmental
standards, to regulate the activities of multinational companies through a corporate
accountability convention, as proposed at the UN World Summit on Sustainable
Development, or to screen flows of private finance for their environmental impacts,
have so far been successfully resisted. Instead, there is a growing evidence of a
staggering and highly damaging degree of policy incoherence whereby there are low
levels of integration of environmental goals into mainstream economic, trade and
development policy such that policy in these areas systematically undermines the
48 Nicolas Hildyard, ‘Foxes in Charge of the Chickens’, in Wolfgang Sachs (eds), Global Ecology
(London: Zed Books, 1993), pp. 22–35; Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, The Earth Brokers:
Power, Politics and World Development (London: Routledge, 1994).
49 Benton, ‘An Ecological Historical Materialism’, p. 85.
50 Saurin, ‘Global Environmental Crisis’, p. 74.
51 Marc Williams, ‘Trade and the Environment in the World Trading System: A Decade of
Stalemate?’, Global Environmental Politics, 1:4 (2001), pp. 1–10; Peter Newell, ‘Managing
Multinationals: The Governance of Investment for the Environment’, Journal of International
Development, 13 (2001), pp. 907–19.
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achievements of environmental policy. The manifestations of the way in which the
potential achievements of environmental governance are routinely undermined by
the initiatives promoted by global economic institutions are many. Export credit
guarantees and the use of overseas aid money, provided bilaterally and through
funding for multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, continue to be
allocated to developments with devastating environmental consequences, oﬀsetting
the gains made by environmental regimes. Since 1992, the World Bank has spent 25
times more on climate-changing fossil fuels than on renewables. One report found
that less than 10 per cent of all Bank projects are screened for their impact on the
climate.52 Internationally, lack of policy integration between regimes means that the
goals and possible net gains from agreements on climate change, for example, are
reduced to nothing because the WTO, at the same time, negotiates increases in trade
which will increase emissions of CO2 well beyond the savings carefully negotiated in
the climate treaties, by transporting greater volumes of trade around the world.53
Similarly, while there is discussion of the need to promote higher standards of
environmental protection amongst firms, regional trade accords such as NAFTA
include provisions that allow companies to challenge national and local governments
seeking to raise environmental standards in the name of non-discrimination against
foreign investors and to extract compensation from them.
What appear to be, from an environmental point of view, cases of alarming
incoherence in policy objectives, actually make perfect sense once we understand that
discussions about the ecological footprint of market-led globalisation are strictly oﬀ
limits. Reform proposals that deviate from received wisdoms about the pre-eminence
of individual property rights and (ostensibly) laissez-faire economics, are discredited
and ridiculed. While economic orthodoxies are sacrosanct and protected from
scrutiny, environmental measures are always evaluated according to their potential to
negatively aﬀect capital accumulation objectives. Describing this in terms of a shift in
power between the public and private realms, Saurin shows that while the public
realm is left attempting to resolve harms generated by private actors, ‘the private
entities – businesses and corporations – retain authority over production systems’.54
The increasing popularity of market-based instruments of environmental regula-
tion in the form of environmental taxation, labelling, voluntary (self) regulation and
permit trading, is indicative of this reorganisation of power and authority between
state and capital, reflecting and embodying many of the trends described above.
Threats to accumulation imperatives mean that environmental measures have to be
‘attuned to the incentives and growth possibilities of capitalist firms’.55 This
marketisation of environmental policy is certainly not hegemonic, however. It is an
expression of the contemporary organisation of the global economy and the
ideologies that rationalise its operations. Not only are there deviations from it in the
52 Sustainable Energy and Economy Network USA, International Trade Information Service, US
Halifax Initiative, Canada; and Reform the World Bank Campaign, Italy. The World Bank and the
G7: Changing the Earth’s Climate for Business: An Analysis of the World Bank Fossil Fuel Project
Lending since the 1992 Earth Summit June 1997.
53 To take a brief example, to import 1 kg of asparagus from California to Europe requires four litres
of fuel. If grown domestically, the ‘energy grab’ from transport would be over 900 times less. New
Economics Foundation, Collision Course: Free Trade’s Free Ride on the Global Climate (London:
NEF, 2003).
54 Saurin, ‘Global Environmental Crisis, p. 76.
55 Vlachou, ‘Capitalism and Ecological Sustainability, p. 937.
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form of diﬀerent national and regional approaches to regulation, but in everyday
practice around the world, customary patterns of resource stewardship continue to
survive, existing alongside market structures or subversive of them. Marketisation,
therefore, describes a particular historical juncture already subject to significant
contestation, but perhaps flexible enough to accommodate challenges to its reach
without confronting the relations of power which underpin it.
A broader notion of governance
Drawing on critiques from political geography about the narrow understandings of
governance that are often applied to environmental politics, a political economy
approach needs to move beyond traditional thinking in IR about hierarchies of
levels, the boundedness of actors and linearities of decision-making which are
assumed to follow a ‘cascade’ model where one level of political authority flows to
the next in a natural downward trend.56 We need to understand multi-cited network
formations, being sensitive to the diﬀerent forms that governance takes, challenging
reified categories of national/global or inside/outside as these ‘may obscure and
subordinate such axes of analysis as ecology, race and gender’57 which are important
to understanding who governs and on whose behalf.
To adequately capture the dynamics of bloc formation and more embryonic forms
of coalition evolution across scales, a political economy approach has to be
transnational in scale, able to explore dynamics within and across the state, within
firms, across ‘levels’ and bridging public/private divides, such as they exist. This
departs from conventional analysis of environmental governance which tends to reify
‘the level of analysis problem’ in IR. Transnationalist approaches, such as that
developed by Risse-Kappen,58 which look at how global political outcomes are
mediated through domestic institutions and coalitions, may help to advance a theory
of regimes that transcends state/non-state and domestic/international analytical
divides. Adopting a political economy frame, however, allows us to account for why
some coalitions and alliances of interest have a greater bearing on global policy than
others. Policy responses and the governance structures that give rise to them are
understood as products of a particular configuration of historical and material
circumstances. A political economy of transnationalism means being open to a
plurality of governance forms, without falling into liberal assumptions about equality
of power, actors and the neutrality of institutions. A neo-Gramscian framework is
helpful in this regard. As Gale argues, ‘A neo-Gramscian approach forces us to widen
our focus beyond the diplomats who are formally engaged in negotiations to include
the struggles taking place among competing social forces over the principles, norms,
rules and procedures of the international regime’.59 Politicising and historicising the
56 Harriet Bulkeley, ‘Reconfiguring Environmental Governance: Towards a Politics of Scales and
Networks’, Political Geography, 24 (2005), pp. 875–902.
57 Laurie Adkins, ‘Democracy, Ecology, Political Economy: Reflections on Starting Points’, in Fred
Gale and Michael M’Gonigle (eds), Nature, Production and Power: Towards an Ecological Political
Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), pp. 59–83, p. 70.
58 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
59 Gale, ‘Cave! Hic dragones’, p. 277.
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function of institutions in this way is important to negating the idea that the impacts
of institutions are socially and environmentally neutral and that the decisions they
make embody general and public rather than specific private interests.
Arguing for such an approach does not amount to an endorsement of exaggerated
and therefore problematic claims about the entrenchment of a ‘post-sovereign’ or
‘neo-medieval’ form of (environmental) politics; a liberal reading of global govern-
ance which conveys, explicitly or implicitly, ‘a pluralistic and post-ideological
conception of the world’.60 As with some accounts of the rise of private environ-
mental governance, there is a tendency to underplay the role of the state as the
centrifugal unit in such networks. Even where they seemingly bypass the state, as
certification bodies do, they often ultimately require forms of state authority, or at
the very least government consent, to operate in an authoritative institutional
manner.61 Duﬀy shows, for example, that while patterns of global environmental
governance claim to ‘re-order’ politics whereby ‘complex networks of non-state
actors govern, authorise and regulate, the process of implementation is still heavily
reliant on national governments’.62
There is an important and conceptually significant diﬀerence, therefore, between
the performance of governing roles and the exercise of authority. Though it is not
appropriate to reduce the question of authority to sovereignty, gaining competence
in the provision of some state functions ‘does not in itself elevate the non-state to an
equivalent positions of authority’.63 If the exercise of authority implies both the
power of sanction and enforcement (of law) on the one hand, and claims to
representation on the other, it excludes most non-state governance providers. If,
however, acting authoritatively, even producing law (through standards, and so on),
without the backing of a democratic mandate is suﬃcient, then non-state actors can
legitimately be said to be ‘authority brokers’. Recognising multiple sources of
authority and competition between governance providers in global environmental
governance is not the same as claiming that each carries equal weight, authority or
legitimacy. Merely that in seeking to account for the changing landscape of global
environmental governance, our understanding of governance has to decentre the idea
that states are the exclusive providers of eﬀective environmental governance. The
‘denationalization’ of governance’64 means that while some forms of environmental
governance remain state-dominated (UN treaties), others reflect market dominance
(environmental management systems) or predominant roles for civil society organi-
sations (civil regulation), but more often they embody hybrid formations whose
governance practices are only possible through cooperation and competition between
each of the key ‘governance providers’. Indeed, Arts notes, ‘the environmental
domain has been a laboratory for new modes of governance par excellence’.65
60 Rosaleen Duﬀy, ‘The Politics of Global Environmental Governance: The Powers and Limitations
of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Central Americas’, Review of International Studies, 31
(2005), pp. 307–23, at 309.
61 Robert Falkner, ‘Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the
Links’, Global Environmental Politics, 3:2 (2003), pp. 72–88.
62 Duﬀy, ‘The Politics of Global Environmental Governance’, p. 319.
63 Conca, ‘Old States in New Bottles?’, p. 189.
64 Mathias Koenig-Arhibugi, ‘Institutional Diversity in Global Governance’, in M. Koenig-Arhibugi
and Micheal Zu¨rn (eds), New Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness,
Delegation and Inclusiveness (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 1–31, p. 2.
65 Arts, ‘Non-State Actors’, p. 184.
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From a political economy perspective, decentring spatiality with causation as the
reference point for identifying and explaining patterns of global environmental
governance, yields important insights.66 An emphasis on causation requires us to
look for governance practices in global politics in domains traditionally considered
neither political nor capable of ‘governing’. This is a notion of governance where the
environment is ‘governed’ in ways that derive from routine market transactions of
huge ecological significance. Business is not just a subject of a regulatory system
imposed by the state. Rather, business is an intrinsic part of the fabric of environ-
mental governance, as rule-maker, and often rule-enforcer. Businesses construct and
enforce their own systems of environmental and market governance through pro-
grammes of certification, such as the FSC (Forestry Stewardship Council) for
example, and processes of standard-setting along the supply-chain.67 These, in many
ways, exist outside formal patterns of environmental governance, traditionally
understood. Grant claims, for instance; ‘International firms create the need for
improved governance, but they do not and cannot provide it’.68 At a fundamental
level, however, corporate strategies, with the command of capital and impact on
resource use that they imply at company, sectoral level and along the supply-chain,
generate ‘norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a given area of Inter-
national Relations’, following Krasner’s classic definition of a regime.69 They are, in
other words, regime actors in their own right, though not in a way that would fit the
narrow definitions of governance traditionally employed by scholars of IR and IPE.
At the level of rule enforcement, Dauvergne’s study of the logging industry in Asia
demonstrates how the governance system is dominated by informal corporate norms
and logging practices, resulting in severe environmental impacts.70 It is often also the
case that despite the globalising ambitions of governance projects, they encounter
local resistances and disruptions that often derive from competing, albeit often more
informal, even criminalised, ‘governance’ practices. Duﬀy’s study of transfrontier
conservation areas in Central America makes us ‘aware of the power and limitations
of global governance by the challenges it faces in its implementation’.71 In respect
both of rule-makers and rule-enforcers, private formulations of governance are more
adequately captured by Rosenau’s definition where ‘governance is . . . a system of
rule that is as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned
constitutions . . . of regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function
eﬀectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority.’72
Once it is accepted that market actors, in particular, are key sites of environmental
governance in the global political economy, we need theoretical tools to understand
how they practice governance; we need to get inside the firm as a governance actor.
Looking ‘inside’ market actors enables us to understand their strategies and influence
66 Lucy Ford, ‘Challenging the Global Environmental Governance of Toxics: Social Movement
Agency and Global Civil Society’, in David Levy and Peter Newell, The Business of Global
Environmental Governance, pp. 305–329.
67 Ronie Garcia-Johnson, Exporting Environmentalism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
68 Cited in Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Institutional Diversity’, p. 10.
69 Krasner, International Regimes, p. 2.
70 Peter Dauvergne, ‘The Environmental Challenge to Loggers in the Asia-Pacific: Corporate Practices
in Informal Regimes of Governance’, in David Levy and Peter Newell, The Business of Global
Environmental Governance, p. 169–197.
71 Duﬀy, ‘The Politics of Global Environmental Governance’, p. 310.
72 James Rosenau and E. O. Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 4–5.
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and therefore their role within systems of environmental governance. A political
economy approach, while recognising the embeddedness of regimes in broader
structures, needs then to address the specific conditions under which market actors
engage with particular issue arenas; to demonstrate the relationship between the
macro and micro dimensions of governance. In so far as shifts in the corporate
strategies of leading firms circumscribe the policy space available to environmental
regulators whose actions, in turn, bring about shifts in technological choices,
investment options and production processes, we need to account for these reciprocal
relationships. Levy and Newell73 have constructed one possible framework for such
an enquiry, and issue and firm specific74 work that has sought to understand and
weight the significance of diﬀerent drivers of firms’ behaviour in relation to
environmental policy, suggests future directions for research. Greater attention is
needed, though, to the role of financial actors; banks, stock markets and credit rating
agencies that steer flows of finance in the global economy with enormous implications
for cycles of environmental degradation.
Looking at market actors as governance institutions in their own right challenges
us to go beyond treating corporate interests at an abstract, aggregate level; capital
rather than corporations. By opening up the ‘black box’ of the firm to more critical
scrutiny, we may be better placed to locate the linkages and connections between
inter- and intra-firm decision-making and the activities of firms as agents of
environmental governance. Amoore’s notion of the ‘contested firm’ is useful in this
regard, as it seeks to go beyond treating firms as ‘actors, reactors and transmitters of
global imperatives’.75 Falkner, for example, challenges the idea that business
passively adapts to the ‘technology-forcing’ pressures of environmental regulation.
Rather, he argues persuasively that the innovative capacity of firms represents a form
of ‘technological power’, which can play a critical role in shaping the design and
phasing of environmental regulations.76 Such approaches require us to do more than
regard firms as transmission belts between national and global levels of analysis and
to challenge their predominant construction in IPE as atomised, rational, unitary
actors, an approach which is subject to many of the failings of conventional IR
theory.
If including analysis of market actors provides answers to the question ‘who
governs’, we can deepen our understanding of ‘how they govern’ by locating the
quotidian practices of environmental governance within the broader politics of
neo-liberalism which produce them. Marketised environmental governance is a
mode of neoliberal governance. That is to say, the modalities, ideologies and forms
which environmental governance assumes inevitably bear the characteristics of the
neoliberal economy of which they are a part.77 The depoliticisation of aspects of
73 David Levy and Peter Newell, ‘Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance:
Toward a Neo-Gramscian Synthesis’, Global Environmental Politics, 3:4 (2002), pp. 84–101.
74 Brewster Kneen, Invisible Giant: Cargill and its Transnational Strategies (London: Pluto Press,
2002).
75 Amoore, ‘International Political Economy’, p. 183.
76 Robert Falkner, ‘The Business of Ozone Layer Protection: Corporate Power in Regime Evolution’,
in David Levy and Peter Newell (eds), The Business of Global Environmental Governance, pp.
105–34.
77 The literature on ‘neo-liberal environments’ develops this argument further. Noel Castree,
‘Commodifying What Nature?’, Progress in Human Geography 27:2 (2003), pp. 273–92; Noel
Castree, ‘Marxism and the Production of Nature’, Capital and Class, 72 (2000), pp. 5–36.
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environmental governance through its conduct in private arenas free from public
scrutiny and participation reflects attempts to settle political questions in a
‘technical’ manner within institutions where states have less control (such as the
International Organisation for Standardisation). The emphasis on voluntarism
embodies an anti-statist neoliberal presumption about the ineﬃciency of tradi-
tional ‘command-and-control’ state-based approaches to regulation. The fetishisa-
tion of partnership, which reached a climax at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, reflects the desire for a consensus-based ‘stakeholder’ form of
politics which denies the existence of underlying social conflicts. The hegemony of
discourses of eco-eﬃciency in pronouncements by states and influential bodies such
as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development78 reflect the purchase
that market-based concepts have as validating devices in broader political dis-
course. Indeed, the logic and goals of neoliberalism infuse environmental initia-
tives. The ends of politics have to be justified in terms of their contributions to
competitiveness and eﬃciency, hence the rise of the ‘business case’ for sustainable
development, just as businesses have to be persuaded that poverty reduction
presents a potential accumulation strategy in order to induce action.79 In the EU,
environmental measures have to be justified in relation to their ability to help
achieve the goal of full market integration.80 The use of cost-benefit analysis
continues to be the preferred way of demonstrating this and of determining the
value of environmental policy measures, despite the controversy surrounding its
use and the way such assessments apportion value.81
Multi-dimensional view of power
An enlarged and reframed understanding of what governance is, the forms it takes
and the actors engaged in its practice requires a multi-dimensional view of power.
Beyond reflections about the changing nature of state-based power, noted above,
there is clearly a need to develop further approaches which are able to capture
non-state forms and expressions of power. There is already a great deal of work on
global environmental politics that seeks to assess the observable political influence of
diﬀerent non-state actors.82 Rarely, however, does it explore second and third
dimensions of power,83 taking seriously less observable forms of power at work
that determine which issues get addressed (and are subject to governance regimes)
78 Stephen Schmidheiny, Changing Course (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
79 C. K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing, 2005); Craig Wilson and Peter Wilson,
Make Poverty Business: Increase Profits and Reduce Risks by Engaging with the Poor (Sheﬃeld:
Greenleaf Publishing, 2006).
80 Wyn Grant, Duncan Mattews and Peter Newell, The Eﬀectiveness of EU Environmental Policy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
81 Micheal Jacobs, ‘The Limits of Neoclassicalism’, in Michael Redclift and Ted Benton (eds), Social
Theory and the Global Environment (London: Routledge, 1994).
82 Bas Arts, The Political Influence of Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity
Conventions (Utrecht: International Books, 1998); Michelle Betsill and Elizabeth Correll, ‘NGO
Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis’, Global
Environmental Politics, 1:4 (2000), pp. 65–85.
83 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 2005).
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which are not and why. This neglect is also true of the broader forms of structural
power which shape the conduct of global politics of which regimes are just one
manifestation.84 Newell85 has made the case for the importance of importing into the
study of global environmental politics ideas developed in debates about community
power around ‘anticipated reaction’, and the ‘un-politics’86 of issues that are screened
out of debates by the ‘mobilisation of bias’.87 Newell and Paterson88 have also
developed a structural account which places the relationship between state and
capital centrally as a key element in understanding the position of states vis-à-vis
environmental threats from which they benefit economically and which derive from
economic actors with whom they have close ties and are reluctant to regulate.
A more nuanced and persuasive account also demands attention to the material,
organisational and discursive elements of power and their interrelationship which find
form in the contemporary practices of environmental governance. The material
element needs to take seriously Cox’s notion that ‘production creates the material
basis for all forms of social existence, and, the ways in which human eﬀorts are
combined in productive processes aﬀect all other aspects of social life, including the
polity’.89 The arguments above about the ways in which the production of environ-
mental harm sets the contours of action and probable eﬀectiveness of initiatives
undertaken by the environmental polity bear this out. In turn, ‘Institutions reflect the
power relations prevailing at the point of origin and tend, at least initially, to
encourage collective images consistent with these power relations’.90 Taking institu-
tions seriously, however, means engaging with the possibility of autonomous
institutional eﬀects not guided exclusively by the needs of capital or derived rigidly
from a particular mode of production. The conflicts described above where regimes
and other governance forms become sites of contestation over access to resources and
their control is indicative of this uncertainty of political outcome.
At a discursive level, the embrace of ideas about ‘ecological modernisation’ and
‘sustainable development’ indicate the way in which discourses and the institutions
which adopt and diﬀuse them play a part in reconciling contradictions that derive
from the conflict between the nature of production in the global economy and the
ecological harm it generates, which public institutions are then expected to remedy,
manage and control. Discursive power then reflects ‘the argumentative struggle that
determines which perceptions at some point start to dominate the course of aﬀairs in
environmental politics’.91 At the interface of power/knowledge, instead of viewing
scientists merely as facilitators of cooperation as conventional accounts do,92 a
political economy approach would view their contribution to policy as political; a
84 Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, International Organization, 36
(1983), pp. 488–90.
85 Newell, ‘Climate for Change’.
86 Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution (London and Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971).
87 Elmar Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1960).
88 Newell and Paterson, ‘Climate for business’.
89 Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987),
p. 1.
90 Ibid., p. 219.
91 Maarten Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernisation and the Policy
Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 19.
92 Haas, ‘Obtaining International Environmental Cooperation’.
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result of complex processes of framing and accommodation. Scientists often ally
themselves in environmental debates with NGOs, business or the media to advance
and entrench their position and engage in a game of political bargaining which aﬀects
the content and presentation of their advice. The political and economic significance
of the solutions they are in a position to propose helps to explain contests over the
construction of policy-relevant scientific findings.93
A meaningful analysis of power in global environmental governance has to
operate across a number of sites. At a macro level we have to understand the power
of multinational firms as a product of a series of structural changes in the global
economy that have changed the relationship within and between states and firms.
Many of these changes have been institutionalised in global accords whereby the
rights of capital are protected from state interference, as we saw above. These rights
are secured and advanced through the machinery of bodies such as the WTO that can
discipline states not abiding by the ‘laws’ of the market. The internationalisation of
production and mobility of capital, brought about both through changes in tech-
nology and state policy in the form of removing capital controls, have enhanced the
leverage of firms to set the terms of investment. This power has translated into the
sorts of political roles, described above, where in their own right, as well as through
practices of coalition-building, firms have been able to shape environmental agendas
at national, regional and international levels. In turn, the positions leading firms have
adopted across a range of issues from climate change to biotechnology are driven by
their corporate strategies and the constraints imposed by technology and production
choices. At the same time, the dynamic flows the other way whereby global discourses
and regulatory arrangements impact upon choices at firm level and, therefore, also set
the parameters of corporate strategy. What we observe then is a reciprocal relation-
ship between corporate strategy and governance, operating across a number of levels.
For hegemony to be exercised, though never complete, material, organisational
and discursive elements of power need to be closely aligned. Change in each form of
power opens up continual opportunities to contest existing forms of environmental
governance and produce new forms. Since state actors are increasingly not the only
sources of material, organisational or discursive power, the understanding of power
central to political economy accounts has to account for the power exercised by
corporate and civil society actors in their coalition-building across diﬀerent sites in
the global political economy and involving engagements between a plurality of
non-state and state actors.
Critical
In so far as it seeks to understand the current organisation of the global political
economy in order to change it, a political economy account is critical in Cox’s
understanding of critical theory which distinguishes itself from problem-solving
93 Sheila Jasanoﬀ, ‘Product Process or Programme: Three Cultures and the Regulation of
Biotechnology’, in M. Bauer (ed.), Resistance to New Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) pp. 311–31; Brian Wynne, ‘Scientific Knowledge and the Global
Environment’, in Michael Redclift and Ted Benton (eds), Social Theory and the Global Environment
(London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 169–90.
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theory.94 In this sense it seeks to identify a moment of exploitation or degradation
and attempt to understand the historical, material and political forces that allowed it
to happen. However, unlike conventional approaches that would look to the state or
international institutions for the source of the problem, assuming evidence of a
governance failure or absence of coordinated inter-state action, a political economy
approach would have to cast the analytical net wider; looking at a broader range of
actors and structures which create and sustain environmental degradation.
This means not viewing environmental problems as discrete issues manageable in
their own terms, but as products of existing patterns of political and social power.
Vast bodies of work on environmental justice demonstrate vividly the way in which
environmental degradation is often a signifier of social neglect and tends to be
concentrated in areas of the world (North and South) where poorer people ‘work,
live and play’ to coin a phrase from the environmental justice movement.95 Questions
of race, class and gender are key here in accounting for the production and
distribution of environmental harm and the profits derived from it; in other words
what is governed and on whose behalf.96 A critical approach has to engage in serious
analysis of the ecological eﬀectiveness and social impact of prevailing governance
arrangements. Analysis needs to be driven by the nature of the problem rather than
the requirements of pressing problems into conventional theoretical categories. As
Ku¨tting argues, ‘Institutions . . . are not the defining boundaries within which
eﬀectiveness is analysed; they are given by the structures, origins and remedies of the
problem of environmental degradation’.97 Such problems, if they are to be addressed,
need to take account of the fact that, as Strange argues, ‘since the chain of cause and
eﬀect so often originates in technology and markets, passing through national policy
decisions to emerge as negotiating postures in multilateral discussions, it follows that
attention to the resultant international agreement of some sort is apt to overlook
most of the determining factors on which agreement may, in brief, rest’.98
A political economy account is also critical in the Coxian sense of seeking
potential for transformation; emphasising the dynamic in world politics rather than
patterns of order and stability, even if it employs historical and material analysis to
account for how and why a particular order of environmental governance came to be.
Emphasis on the multiplicity of environmental governance forms, described above, is
derived from a reading of change in the sites of authority, and shifts in relations of
power between state, market and civil society. Once the political and social forces
that produce environmental change are placed centrally in the analysis, it becomes
easier to decipher moments of change and sites of resistance. Because specific
constellations of social forces and production produce particular types of environ-
mental change, disruptions in the relationship between state, market and civil society
actors and the historical blocs of which they are a part, give rise to new patterns of
environmental governance. Competing interests, even or especially within capital,
94 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory’,
Millennium Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–51.
95 See, for example, Robert Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the
Politics of Pollution (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 2005).
96 Peter Newell, ‘Race, Class and the Global Politics of Environmental Inequality’, Global
Environmental Politics, 5:3 (2005), pp. 70–94.
97 Gabriela Ku¨tting, Environment, Society and International Relations: Towards More Eﬀective
International Environmental Agreements (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 3.
98 Strange, ‘Cave! Hic dragones’, pp. 488–90.
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provide opportunities to construct new coalitions that may ultimately produce new
patterns of environmental governance. Paterson shows how Greenpeace’s attempt to
bring the insurance industry into a coalition of actors advocating action on climate
change, playing on the industry’s sensitivity to large pay-outs associated with
climate-related damage to client’s property, was aimed at fracturing the unity of the
industry bloc opposed to action.99 The Climate Group, in their attempt to make the
economic case for action on global warming, have sought alliances with progressive
local government authorities and businesses to counter the claims of powerful
industry lobbies that oppose action on climate change regarding the scale of
economic costs associated with tackling the problem.100 Once the shift from a narrow
focus on governance outcomes, thought to be existence of a treaty or an institution,
to governance processes takes place, we are better placed to engage in necessary
critical forms of enquiry about the contestation of processes which is ongoing and
never reaches closure. Environmental governance from this perspective assumes a
more dynamic quality, inevitably reflecting and embodying the broader political and
economic structures and processes of which it is a part.
Finally, consistent with the duty of adopting a critical approach, a key obligation is
to identify and engage with strategic dilemmas facing progressive movements for
change. In the light of the analysis above it is clear that the environmental movement
cannot aﬀord to focus its attention exclusively on those global actors and institutions
that identify themselves as environmental in isolation from the global economic
processes in which they are embedded. Environmentalists have been heavily involved
in campaigns around global investment accords such as the MAI (Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment), in global trade negotiations hosted by the WTO and in cam-
paigns to hold multinational companies to account for their social and environmental
responsibilities wherever they operate. The strategic dilemma is where to concentrate
eﬀorts; working with those bodies developing legally binding international environ-
mental law with all its limitations, or mobilising to influence the activities of firms,
banks and those actors whose day to day decisions impact more directly on patterns of
natural resource use than any global institution could ever hope to.
Ultimately we return to the state as an important, if not central, site in the struggle
for sustainability. As unreliable an ally as the state can be given the networks of
power in which it is embedded, and the interests it responds to and represents, it
remains a key source of authority and power that can force changes that are almost
impossible to imagine by other means. As Conca notes, ‘governments are central to
any meaningful action for global sustainability – just as they have been central to the
processes of modernization, marketization and enclosure that have delivered us to
our current circumstances of ecological peril’.101 The challenge is to work with
progressive elements within the state when it makes sense to, lobby firms and
investors directly when such pressure is likely to achieve more and to form global
coalitions to shift the agendas of global institutions when decisions reach beyond the
sphere of either of these. In engaging in such short term politicking, we have to keep
alive a vision in which choices about which globalisation we want are subject to the
99 Matthew Paterson, ‘Insurance and the Politics of Global Warming’, IDS Bulletin, 30:3 pp. 25–30.
100 〈http://www.theclimategroup.org/〉, accessed 27 February 2006.
101 Ken Conca, ‘Beyond the Statist Frame: Environmental Politics in a Global Economy’, in Fred
Gale and Michael M’Gonigle (eds), Nature, Production and Power: Towards an Ecological Political
Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), pp. 141–59, at 142.
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imperative of constructing a more sustainable global system and not the other way
around.
Conclusions
It has been argued here that a political economy account, one which departs from
conventional theoretical perspectives in its view of governance and power, is better
able to capture the multi-sited, marketised and increasingly transnational forms
of governance which characterise contemporary global environmental politics.
This provides us with an improved and less bounded sense of who governs and on
whose behalf, how they govern and the implications of those practices of governing,
in social and environmental terms. It was shown that by understanding patterns
of environmental governance as a product of the neoliberal context in which
they develop and at the same time reproduce, we are better placed to understand
why environmental politics take the form they do and the likely barriers to
attempted reforms that go beyond the ‘ecological modernisation’ of capitalism as
usual.102
In developing and enriching this approach, the challenge will be to connect
empirically and account for theoretically, the ways in which ‘macro’ social and
economic forces in the global economy configure the ‘micro’ practices of environ-
mental politics in particular sites without losing a sense of what makes those sites
unique. Transnational managerial elites and the role they play in key global economic
institutions, public and private, undoubtedly serve to circumscribe the scope of
autonomy and policy diﬀerence at national level. But the process is not a passive one
and varieties of environmental capitalism compete with one another, produce
diversity, become contested and therefore are always in transition. The diﬀerences in
political culture, ideology of regulation and relationships to business between the
European Union and the US, which have been at the heart of global conflicts over the
governance of agricultural biotechnology and climate change, for example, have had
widespread repercussions for the global management of those threats.103 Responses
to threats in the two areas reflect distinct models of state-business relationships and
a conflicting sense of how strategic national economic interests will be aﬀected by
action on the issue. The outcomes of contests between diﬀerent fractions of capital
and competing elements within the state in the power centres of the global economy
profoundly shape the forms of environmentalism that are ‘exported’104 to the rest of
the world through supply chains or projected into global arenas. The rise of economic
powers with weaker traditions of environmental leadership such as India and China
looks set to recast the world of global environmental politics once again. Global
economic concerns and growth ambitions can be expected to set the limits of formal
environmental cooperation even more acutely in the future. How industry and
102 Arthur Mol, Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological Modernization of the Global
Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
103 Joseph Murphy and Les Levidow, Governing the Transatlantic Conflict over Agricultural
Biotechnology: Contending Coalitions, Trade Liberalization and Standard Setting (London:
Routledge, 2006); Thomas Bernauer, Genes, Trade and Regulation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
104 Garcia-Johnson, Exporting Environmentalism.
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financial actors respond to investment opportunities in regions of the global economy
where environmental regulation is either non-existent, less developed or poorly
enforced will have a large bearing on the success of environmental governance, public
and private, national, local and international.
To feed the potential of these new forms of theoretical enquiry requires a diﬀerent
empirical focus, one which seeks to explore the ways in which particular environ-
mental practices are embedded within broader relations of political and economic
power which determine the limits of the possible and the likely sites of resistance. This
means understanding the intimate relationship between the economic forces that
generate environmental change and the political coalitions and institutional forms
which assume the responsibility for delivering environmental protection. It is
increasingly not enough, if indeed it ever was, to study global actors and institutions
that identify themselves as environmental in isolation from the global economic
processes in which they are embedded, and which ultimately they will have to regulate
if they are to make a diﬀerence.
The political economy of global environmental governance 529
